

**Online Appendix to “To Revoke or Not Revoke: The  
Political Determinants of Executive Order Longevity”**

## Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics

Table A1: Description of Independent Variables

Variable Name	Description
<b><i>EO-Specific Covariates</i></b>	
Divided Government	1 if the executive order is issued by a president from the opposing party of either the House or the Senate; 0 otherwise
D(President, Congress)	The absolute distance between the ideal points of the issuing president and the median member of Congress, averaged across the House and the Senate, at the time of issuance, using DW-NOMINATE scores
Recent Statutory Authority	1 if the executive order cites a specific statute passed within a year of its issuance as its source of authority; 0 otherwise
Foreign Policy	1 if the executive order is related to foreign, defense, or national security policy; 0 if the order is based on domestic authority
NY Times Mention	1 if the executive order is mentioned in the <i>New York Times</i> ; 0 otherwise
Public Mention	1 if the executive order is mentioned in the <i>Public Papers of the President</i> ; 0 otherwise
Ln (EO Words)	The logged number of words contained in the executive order
War	1 if the executive order is issued during U.S. involvement in World War II (1941 – 1945), the Korean War (1950 – 1953), the Vietnam War (1964 – 1975), the Gulf War (1990 – 1991), and the period of heaviest combat during the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars (2001 – 2003); 0 otherwise
Inflation	The annual inflation rate during the year in which the executive order was issued
Public Approval	The issuing president's public approval rating (Gallup Poll) during the year in which the executive order was issued
Election Year	1 if the executive order is issued during a presidential election year; 0 otherwise
Administration Change	1 if the executive order is issued during the first year of a president from opposing party of the previous president; 0 otherwise
End Term	1 if the executive order is issued during the last year of an outgoing president; 0 otherwise
Trend	0 if executive order is issued in 1937, 1 if issued in 1938, 2 if issued in 1939, etc
<b><i>Time-Changing Political Covariates</i></b>	
Opposing President	1 if the issuing president and the current president are from opposing parties; 0 otherwise
D (Issuing President, Current President)	The absolute distance between the ideal points of the issuing president and the current president, using DW-NOMINATE

	scores
Current Divided Government	1 if the current president and either the current House or the Senate are from opposing parties; 0 otherwise
D (Current President, Current Congress)	The absolute distance between the ideal points of the current president and the median member of the current Congress, averaged across the House and the Senate, using DW-NOMINATE scores
Current Public Approval	The current president's public approval rating (Gallup Poll) during the current year
Current Inflation	The annual inflation rate during the current year (Bureau of Census)
Current Election Year	1 if current year corresponds to a presidential election year; 0 otherwise
Ln (EOs Issued)	The logged number of executive orders issued in the current year
Current Administration Change	1 if the current year is during the first year of a president from opposing party of the previous president; 0 otherwise
Current End Term	1 if the current year is during the last year of an outgoing president; 0 otherwise
Current War	1 if the current year during U.S. involvement in World War II (1941 – 1945), the Korean War (1950 – 1953), the Vietnam War (1964 – 1975), the Gulf War (1990 – 1991), and the period of heaviest combat during the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars (2001 – 2003); 0 otherwise
Current Trend	0 if the current year is 1937, 1 if year is 1938, 1 if year is 1939, etc

Table A2: Summary Statistics

	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
<b><i>EO-Specific Covariates</i></b>					
Divided Government	0.22	0	0.42	0	1
D(President, Congress)	0.39	0.35	0.14	0.08	0.84
Recent Statutory Authority	0.17	0	0.37	0	1
Foreign Policy	0.24	0	0.43	0	1
NY Times Mention	0.13	0	0.34	0	1
Public Mention	0.06	0	0.23	0	1
Ln (EO Words)	5.52	5.51	1.38	0	10.86
War	0.31	0	0.46	0	1
Inflation	3.74	3.16	3.97	-1.88	14.33
Public Approval	58.94	63.79	15.39	25.5	83
Election Year	0.18	0	0.38	0	1
Administration Change	0.05	0	0.21	0	1
End Term	0.07	0	0.25	0	1
Trend	14.78	8	16.32	0	76
<b><i>Time-Changing Political Covariates</i></b>					
Opposing President	0.49	0	0.50	0	1
D (Issuing President, Current President)	0.51	0.39	0.45	0	1.27
Current Divided Government	0.6	1	0.49	0	1
D (Current President, Current Congress)	0.51	0.49	0.2	0.08	0.835
Current Public Approval	53.72	54.46	11.98	25.5	76.22
Current Inflation	3.81	2.99	3.03	-1.88	14.33
Current Election Year	0.25	0	0.43	0	1
Ln (EOs Issued)	4.00	3.99	0.47	3.00	5.95
Current Administration Change	0.11	0	0.32	0	1
Current End Term	0.11	0	0.31	0	1
Current War	0.30	0	0.46	0	1
Current Trend	44.53	46	20.66	0	78

## Appendix B: Robustness Checks

### *Foreign Policy and Ideological Drift*

Table B1 tests the Conditional Hypothesis by including an interaction between *D(Issuing President, Current President)* and *Foreign Policy*, instead of *Recent Authority*, as an alternative measure for the strength of an executive order's authority. Similar to Table 2 in the manuscript, this table shows the results with and without control variables. Consistent with the Conditional Hypothesis, greater ideological distance between current and issuing presidents decreases longevity only for executive orders related to domestic policy.<sup>1</sup> For orders related to foreign policy, this ideological conflict yields the opposite effect. That is, the distance between current and issuing presidents significantly increases executive order longevity. Thus, once again, ideological drift only occurs for those orders based upon weak authority – as measured by both vague statutory authority and domestic policy orders. Not only are foreign policy orders impervious to such drift, but presidents are even less likely to revoke these orders when issued by an opposing president.

Table B1: Foreign Policy and Ideological Drift Interaction

	(1)	(2)
<b><i>Interaction</i></b>		
Foreign Policy	0.35 (0.09)**	0.18 (0.08)**
D (Issuing President, Current President)	0.14 (0.07)	0.44 (0.08)*
Foreign Policy * D (Issuing President, Current President)	-0.54 (0.14)**	-0.47 (0.08)**
<b><i>EO-Specific Covariates</i></b>		
D (President, Congress)		-1.79 (0.57)**
<b><i>Controls</i></b>		
NY Times Mention		0.17 (0.07)*
Public Mention		0.51 (0.08)**
War		-0.07 (0.08)

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<sup>1</sup> This coefficient is in the expected direction and is nearly significant at the 0.05 level (p=0.053).

Inflation		0.01 (0.01)
Election Year		0.05 (0.08)
Administration Change		0.11 (0.10)
End Term		-0.18 (0.11)
Trend		0.13 (0.02)**
<b><i>Time-Changing Political Covariates</i></b>		
D (Current President, Current Congress)		-2.39 (0.50)**
Current Inflation		-0.01 (0.01)
Current Election Year		-1.06 (0.11)**
<b><i>Controls</i></b>		
Ln (EOs Issued)		-0.61 (0.19)**
Current Administration Change		-0.12 (0.10)
Current End Term		1.08 (0.17)**
Current War		-0.07 (0.11)
Current Trend		-0.05 (0.02)*
Log-likelihood	-19584.34	-18073.68
N	261,670	261,670
Years	1937 – 2013	1937 – 2013
Presidential Fixed Effects	NO	YES

Coefficients from Cox proportional hazards model with robust standard errors in parentheses and presidential fixed effects (not shown). Two tailed tests, \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ .

### *Temporary and Emergency Functions*

The analysis presented in the manuscript illustrates that executive order longevity can vary by issue area, such as foreign versus domestic policy. Yet, other types of executive orders could influence their duration, particularly those related to temporary functions such as responding to economic and foreign crises, mediating labor disputes, and ones related to temporary commissions. As such, I remove these categories from the analysis and find that the main results generally hold (Table B2, column 2). When including orders related to temporary or emergency functions as an independent variable, *Temporary and Emergency*, the results reveal these orders significantly correspond to shorter lifespans (column 1). Notably, the analysis still yields strong support for the

hypotheses, demonstrating that the analysis is not being driven by these more temporary orders.<sup>2</sup>

Table B2: Temporary and Emergency Functions

	Controlling for Temporary Orders	Excluding Temporary Orders
Temporary and Emergency	0.82 (0.08)**	
<b><i>EO-Specific Covariates</i></b>		
H1: Ideological Compromise		
D(President, Congress)	-1.17 (0.68)	-1.59 (0.78)*
H2: EO Authority		
Recent Statutory Authority	-0.27 (0.09)**	-0.26 (0.09)**
Foreign Policy	-0.32 (0.08)**	-0.19 (0.08)*
<b>Controls</b>		
NY Times Mention	0.07 (0.08)	0.13 (0.09)
Public Mention	0.27 (0.08)**	0.36 (0.10)**
Ln (EO Words)	0.29 (0.03)**	0.28 (0.03)**
War	-0.07 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.14)
Inflation	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Public Approval	-0.01 (0.01)*	-0.01 (0.01)
Election Year	0.19 (0.11)	0.15 (0.13)
Administration Change	0.13 (0.11)	0.25 (0.13)
End Term	-0.33 (0.14)*	-0.23 (0.16)
Trend	0.07 (0.03)*	0.11 (0.04)**
<b><i>Time-Changing Political Covariates</i></b>		
H3: Political Costs		
D (Current President, Current Congress)	-5.66 (0.71)**	-3.43 (0.70)**
Current Public Approval	0.04 (0.00)**	0.04 (0.01)**
Current Inflation	-0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Current Election Year	-1.36 (0.14)**	-1.22 (0.16)**
H4: Opposing President		
D (Issuing President, Current President)	0.29 (0.08)**	0.23 (0.08)**
<b>Controls</b>		
Ln (EOs Issued)	-0.57 (0.32)	0.22 (0.31)
Current Administration Change	-0.04 (0.12)	0.04 (0.13)
Current End Term	1.67 (0.23)**	1.15 (0.23)**
Current War	0.50 (0.23)*	0.14 (0.23)
Current Trend	0.13 (0.03)**	0.09 (0.03)*
Log-likelihood	-11792.71	-9327.01
N	102,626	92,272
Years	1949 – 2013	1949 – 2013
Presidential Fixed Effects	YES	YES

<sup>2</sup> Although *D(President, Congress)* is no longer significant at the 0.05 level in the first column, it maintains its expected negative sign and closely approaches this significance level ( $p=0.088$ ).

Coefficients from Cox proportional hazards model with robust standard errors in parentheses and presidential fixed effects (not shown). Two tailed tests, \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ .

### *Continuing Policy Areas*

In addition to temporary and emergency functions, there are certain issue areas that are ceded to the president by other political actors to continue policies via executive order. Such areas related to continuing policies include the management of civil service, public lands, security classifications, Foreign Service and consular activities, the operation and discipline of the military, and the regulation of government contracting (Cooper 2002). Relatedly, presidents use many executive orders to create, terminate, and alter existing agencies, often White House committees. Further, Mayer (2001) identifies civil rights as an issue area in which presidents have consistently used executive orders to change policy. As such, I exclude these categories from the analysis in column 2 of Table B3 and find that the main results remain robust. Further, the results hold when only examining these policy areas.<sup>3</sup> Finally, I include these areas as independent variables in column 1 and find that the results hold. Most of the categories themselves have an insignificant impact on the duration of orders. However, executive orders related to committee maintenance face shorter lives, while orders related to the civil service and public land endure for long periods of time.

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<sup>3</sup> Although *D(President, Congress)* and *Foreign Policy* are statistically insignificant in the second model, they are in the expected direction and nearly approach the 0.05 level of significance ( $p=0.075$  and  $p=0.114$ ).

Table B3: Continuing Policy Areas

	Controlling for Policy Areas	Excluding Policy Areas
<b>Policy Area Categories</b>		
Committees	0.64 (0.07)**	
Civil Service	-0.66 (0.18)**	
Civil Rights	-0.57 (0.51)	
Intelligence	0.10 (0.32)	
National Security	-0.34 (0.41)	
Foreign Service	-0.26 (0.38)	
Military Operations and Discipline	0.13 (0.13)	
Government Contracting	0.44 (0.38)	
Public Land	-2.73 (0.58)**	
<b>EO-Specific Covariates</b>		
H1: Ideological Compromise		
D(President, Congress)	-1.63 (0.70)*	-1.59 (0.90)
H2: EO Authority		
Recent Statutory Authority	-0.36 (0.09)**	-0.30 (0.10)**
Foreign Policy	-0.17 (0.08)*	-0.14 (0.09)
Controls		
NY Times Mention	0.04 (0.08)	-0.00 (0.10)
Public Mention	0.34 (0.08)**	0.47 (0.11)**
Ln (EO Words)	0.29 (0.03)**	0.30 (0.03)**
War	-0.11 (0.13)	-0.06 (0.15)
Inflation	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Public Approval	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Election Year	0.20 (0.12)	-0.02 (0.15)
Administration Change	0.06 (0.12)	-0.02 (0.16)
End Term	-0.27 (0.14)	-0.04 (0.17)
Trend	0.08 (0.03)*	0.07 (0.04)
<b>Time-Changing Political Covariates</b>		
H3: Political Costs		
D (Current President, Current Congress)	-5.66 (0.71)**	-7.90 (0.98)**
Current Public Approval	0.04 (0.00)**	0.05 (0.01)**
Current Inflation	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.06 (0.03)*
Current Election Year	-1.37 (0.14)**	-1.23 (0.16)**
H4: Opposing President		
D (Issuing President, Current President)	0.30 (0.08)**	0.53 (0.10)**
Controls		
Ln (EOs Issued)	-0.59 (0.33)	-1.15 (0.48)*
Current Administration Change	-0.05 (0.12)	0.04 (0.17)
Current End Term	1.69 (0.23)**	1.73 (0.30)**
Current War	0.49 (0.23)*	0.55 (0.34)
Current Trend	0.12 (0.03)**	0.21 (0.04)**
Log-likelihood	-11754.10	-7203.07
N	102,626	68,830
Years	1949 – 2013	1949 – 2013
Presidential Fixed Effects	YES	YES

Coefficients from Cox proportional hazards model with robust standard errors in parentheses and presidential fixed effects. Two tailed tests, \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01.

### *Omitting EO 12553*

On February 25, 1986, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12553 (“Revocation of Various Executive Orders”), which revoked almost 400 previously issued executive orders and remains to be the order delivering the single most revocations at one time. To ensure that this individual order is not driving the empirical results, I remove it from the analysis in Table B4 and discover that the findings generally hold. Although a couple of main variables fail to reach 0.05 levels of significance, they maintain the expected direction and approach traditional levels of significance.<sup>4</sup>

Table B4: Excluding Reagan EO 12553

	(1)	(2)
<b><i>EO-Specific Covariates</i></b>		
H1: Ideological Compromise		
Divided Government	-0.27 (0.18)	
D(President, Congress)		-2.27 (0.77)**
H2: EO Authority		
Recent Statutory Authority	-0.29 (0.10)**	-0.30 (0.10)**
Foreign Policy	-0.22 (0.09)*	-0.23 (0.09)**
Controls		
NY Times Mention	0.03 (0.10)	0.03 (0.10)
Public Mention	0.43 (0.09)**	0.42 (0.09)**
Ln (EO Words)	0.33 (0.03)**	0.33 (0.03)**
War	-0.03 (0.15)	-0.01 (0.15)
Inflation	-0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)
Public Approval	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Election Year	0.21 (0.13)	0.22 (0.13)
Administration Change	0.12 (0.13)	0.15 (0.13)
End Term	-0.45 (0.16)**	-0.44 (0.16)**
Trend	0.12 (0.03)**	0.16 (0.04)**
<b><i>Time-Changing Political Covariates</i></b>		
H3: Political Costs		
Current Divided Government	-0.25 (0.14)	
D (Current President, Current Congress)		-0.24 (0.59)
Current Public Approval	0.01 (0.01)*	0.01 (0.01)
Current Inflation	0.09 (0.02)**	0.09 (0.02)**
Current Election Year	-0.47 (0.14)**	-0.45 (0.14)**
H4: Opposing President		

<sup>4</sup> For example, p=0.127 for *Divided Government* in model 1, p=0.079 for *Current*

*Divided Government* in model 1, and p=0.071 for *Current Public Approval* in model 2.

Opposing President	0.17 (0.08)*	
D (Issuing President, Current President)		0.19 (0.08)**
<u>Controls</u>		
Ln (EOs Issued)	1.23 (0.29)**	1.27 (0.28)**
Current Administration Change	0.14 (0.12)	0.14 (0.12)
Current End Term	0.19 (0.21)	0.16 (0.21)
Current War	-0.28 (0.20)	-0.30 (0.20)
Current Trend	-0.14 (0.03)**	-0.15 (0.04)**
Log-likelihood	-8418.38	-8416.53
N	95,615	95,615
Years	1949 – 2013	1949 – 2013
Presidential Fixed Effects	YES	YES

Coefficients from Cox proportional hazards model with robust standard errors in parentheses and presidential fixed effects (not shown). Two tailed tests, \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ .

### *Excluding Partially-Revoked Executive Orders*

When a president revokes an executive order, he or she has the option of either fully revoking the entire order or partially revoking certain sections of it. In both cases, presidents are rejecting the legal authority of an order in some way. One potential critique of the main analysis is that including partially-revoked executive orders with full revocations could capture instances where presidents are amending orders rather than outright rejecting them. To address this concern, I re-run the analysis by only counting an order as being revoked if the president has revoked it in full. Thus, partial revocations are not considered revoked orders in this analysis.<sup>5</sup>

Table B4 shows that the results of the main analysis generally hold, with most of the effects being nearly identical to those in the main analysis. Although the issuing president's distance to Congress is only statistically significant at the 0.05 level in model

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<sup>5</sup> This coding is based on the categorization offered by the executive order disposition tables maintained by the National Archives (<http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/disposition.html>).

2, it nearly approaches significance in models 1 and 4 ( $p=0.061$  and  $p=0.051$ , respectively) and thus closely resembles Table 1 in the manuscript. Similarly, foreign policy orders have a nearly significant and negative effect in models 1 and 2 ( $p=0.078$  and  $p=0.073$ ), while this effect is statistically significant at the 0.05 level in the final two columns.

Table B5: Excluding Partially-Revoked Executive Orders

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b><i>EO-Specific Covariates</i></b>				
H1: Ideological Compromise				
Divided Government	-0.22 (0.12)		-0.08 (0.15)	
D(President, Congress)		-1.74 (0.59)**		-1.38 (0.71)
H2: EO Authority				
Recent Statutory Authority			-0.38 (0.09)**	-0.38 (0.09)**
Foreign Policy	-0.11 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.06)	-0.28 (0.08)**	-0.29 (0.08)**
Controls				
NY Times Mention	0.18 (0.07)*	0.18 (0.07)**	0.15 (0.08)	0.15 (0.08)
Public Mention	0.49 (0.08)**	0.49 (0.08)**	0.35 (0.09)**	0.35 (0.09)**
Ln (EO Words)			0.22 (0.03)**	0.22 (0.03)**
War	0.02 (0.09)	0.03 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.07 (0.13)
Inflation	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Public Approval			-0.01 (0.01)*	-0.01 (0.01)
Election Year	0.14 (0.09)	0.14 (0.08)	0.21 (0.11)	0.21 (0.11)
Administration Change	0.13 (0.11)	0.14 (0.11)	0.14 (0.12)	0.15 (0.12)
End Term	-0.31 (0.12)**	-0.29 (0.12)*	-0.35 (0.14)*	-0.35 (0.14)*
Trend	0.11 (0.02)**	0.13 (0.02)**	0.05 (0.03)	0.08 (0.03)*
<b><i>Time-Changing Political Covariates</i></b>				
H3: Political Costs				
Current Divided Government	0.23 (0.14)		-1.19 (0.19)**	
D (Current President, Current Congress)		-2.26 (0.52)**		-5.75 (0.77)**
Current Public Approval			0.05 (0.00)**	0.04 (0.00)**
Current Inflation	-0.03 (0.01)**	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)*
Current Election Year	-1.19 (0.12)**	-1.13 (0.12)**	-1.54 (0.14)**	-1.39 (0.14)**
H4: Opposing President				
Opposing President	0.32 (0.07)**		0.24 (0.07)**	
D (Issuing President, Current President)		0.36 (0.08)**		0.29 (0.08)**
Controls				
Ln (EOs Issued)	-0.52 (0.19)**	-0.57 (0.20)**	-0.65 (0.36)	-0.45 (0.33)
Current Administration Change	-0.12 (0.11)	-0.15 (0.11)	-0.27 (0.14)	-0.11 (0.13)
Current End Term	0.98 (0.18)**	0.96 (0.18)**	1.76 (0.24)**	1.61 (0.24)**
Current War	-0.08 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.11)	0.29 (0.22)	0.50 (0.24)*
Current Trend	-0.08 (0.02)**	-0.04 (0.02)*	0.05 (0.03)	0.14 (0.03)**
Log-likelihood	-16623.92	-16611.73	-11345.13	-11328.85
N	262,358	262,358	101,670	101,670
Years	1937 – 2013	1937 – 2013	1949 – 2013	1949 – 2013
Presidential Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES

Coefficients from Cox proportional hazards model with robust standard errors in parentheses and presidential fixed effects (not shown). Two tailed tests, \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ .

Alternatively, I read through executive orders to determine whether each revoking order amends or rejects the order it claims to revoke. Most of the revoking orders actually do reject the authority of previous orders in several different ways. First, they can outright revoke the order without providing any additional changes to policy. Second, revoking orders can abolish an agency that was created by a previous order. By doing so, the authority of the previous agency is terminated. Third, executive orders can transfer authority from an agency delegated to in the previous order to a different agency. Not only do these transfers take away the authority of the previous agency but they also have the potential to undermine the policy objectives of the issuing president given s/he likely delegates to agencies that will faithfully pursue their goals. A fourth category of rejections can include an order that rejects the authority of another order but makes changes to other policies that are unrelated to the order being rejected. Finally, revoking orders can say that a previous order is revoked, but provide amendments to the text of the previous order or generally amends the policy area in some way. This last category would be most similar to an amending executive order.

As an additional robustness check, I do not count the last category as a revocation, but only include the first four categories (79% of revoking executive orders outright reject the authority of previous orders, while 21% provide amendments) and re-run the

main analysis in Table B6.<sup>6</sup> With the exception of the first hypothesis, the theory is strongly supported by the analysis. Additionally, these results hold when restricting the definition of revocation more narrowly (i.e. to the first three categories or even just the first category).

Taken together, the analyses from Tables B5 and B6 show that the main results hold, even when excluding order revocations that are similar to amendments. Yet, even revoking executive orders that amend a previous policy area can still mostly reject the authority of a previous order by issuing amendments that are contrary to its goals and by eliminating the legal status of the order. Future studies can further disentangle these categories.

Table B6: Excluding Revoking Executive Orders that Resemble Amendments

	(1)	(2)
<b><i>EO-Specific Covariates</i></b>		
H1: Ideological Compromise		
Divided Government	0.05 (0.19)	
D(President, Congress)		0.21 (0.87)
<b><i>H2: EO Authority</i></b>		
Recent Statutory Authority	-0.29 (0.10)**	-0.29 (0.10)**
Foreign Policy	-0.23 (0.08)**	-0.23 (0.08)**
<b><i>Controls</i></b>		
NY Times Mention	0.12 (0.09)	0.12 (0.09)
Public Appeal	0.29 (0.11)**	0.29 (0.11)**
Ln (EO Words)	0.19 (0.03)**	0.19 (0.03)**
War	-0.32 (0.15)*	-0.32 (0.15)*
Inflation	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Public Approval	-0.02 (0.01)**	-0.02 (0.01)*
Election Year	0.17 (0.13)	0.18 (0.13)
Administration Change	0.03 (0.13)	0.02 (0.13)
End Term	-0.21 (0.16)	-0.23 (0.16)
Trend	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
<b><i>Time-Changing Political Covariates</i></b>		
H3: Political Costs		
Current Divided Government	-1.97 (0.30)**	
D (Current President, Current Congress)		-9.24 (0.99)**

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<sup>6</sup> Given the limited availability of executive order texts, I could only run this analysis on all orders issued between 1949 and 2013.

Current Public Approval	0.06 (0.01)**	0.05 (0.01)**
Current Inflation	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)
Current Election Year	-2.14 (0.18)**	-1.86 (0.18)**
<u>H4: Opposing President</u>		
Opposing President	0.26 (0.08)**	
D (Issuing President, Current President)		0.32 (0.09)**
<u>Controls</u>		
Ln (EOs Issued)	-2.67 (0.52)**	-2.02 (0.45)**
Current Administration Change	-0.76 (0.20)**	-0.34 (0.18)
Current End Term	3.06 (0.30)**	2.76 (0.29)**
Current War	1.24 (0.25)**	1.56 (0.28)**
Current Trend	-0.02 (0.04)	0.12 (0.05)*
Log-likelihood	-9080.47	-9062.41
N	106,395	106,395
Years	1949 – 2013	1949 – 2013
Presidential Fixed Effects	YES	YES

Coefficients from Cox proportional hazards model with robust standard errors and presidential fixed effects (not shown). Two tailed tests, \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01.

### *Time Period Analysis*

One potential concern with the theory and main analysis is that presidents in different time periods could behave differently in terms of revocation patterns. The main analysis addresses this possibility by including fixed effects for current and issuing presidents, thereby controlling for the idiosyncrasies of individual presidents and administrations. Additionally, the analysis controls for changes over time with the inclusion of time trend variables. As a robustness check, I interact each of the main variables with the presidential fixed effects and time trend variables (not shown) and find that the main effects hold. In other words, these interactions demonstrate the covariates' influence on executive order longevity is, for the most part, impervious to changes in time and individual presidents. Thus, they generally have a similar impact, as theoretically expected, on revocations across administrations.

To further explore the impact of the main variables on executive order longevity over time, Table B7 subsets the analysis into a pre-1969 period (columns 1 and 2) and a

post-1969 period (columns 3 and 4). The effect of  $D(\text{President}, \text{Congress})$  holds in both time periods, thus maintaining support for the Ideological Compromise Hypothesis. Consistent with the EO Authority Hypothesis, executive orders based on foreign policy and recent statutory authority corresponds to longer longevity. However, these effects appear to only be statistically significant in the post-1969 time period, though remain negative in model 2. Next, though stronger in the post-1969 era, I find at least some support for the Political Costs Hypotheses in both time periods. Across all models, presidents tend to revoke executive orders significantly less often during election years and when their approval is low. Though the effect of  $D(\text{Current President}, \text{Current Congress})$  is negative and statistically significant in three out of the four models, it appears to be positive in the 1937 – 1968 time period.. Finally, when examining the final hypothesis, the effect of  $D(\text{Issuing President}, \text{Current President})$  is only statistically significant in the earlier time periods, though the coefficient is positive as expected in both eras.

Table B7: Pre and Post 1969

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b><i>EO-Specific Covariates</i></b>				
H1: Ideological Compromise				
$D(\text{President}, \text{Congress})$	-2.85 (0.94)**	-1.29 (1.64)	-1.51 (0.76)*	-1.67 (0.81)*
<b>H2: EO Authority</b>				
Recent Statutory Authority		-0.15 (0.12)		-0.59 (0.14)**
Foreign Policy	0.14 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.41 (0.11)**	-0.45 (0.11)**
<b>Controls</b>				
NY Times Mention	0.17 (0.09)	0.22 (0.11)*	0.17 (0.12)	0.04 (0.12)
Public Mention	0.31 (0.15)*	0.06 (0.17)	0.59 (0.10)**	0.42 (0.10)**
$\ln(\text{EO Words})$		0.22 (0.04)**		0.30 (0.04)**
War	-0.19 (0.10)	-0.14 (0.21)	-0.06 (0.20)	0.02 (0.22)
Inflation	0.01 (0.01)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Public Approval		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.01)
Election Year	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.18)	0.31 (0.15)*	0.29 (0.15)*
Administration Change	0.37 (0.17)*	0.29 (0.19)	-0.13 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.17)
End Term	-0.12 (0.15)	-0.04 (0.24)	-0.30 (0.19)	-0.31 (0.19)
Trend	0.17 (0.03)**	0.08 (0.07)	0.09 (0.04)*	0.10 (0.04)*

<b><i>Time-Changing Political Covariates</i></b>				
H3: Political Costs				
D (Current President, Current Congress)	3.53 (0.46)**	-1.92 (0.62)**	-3.04 (0.65)**	-3.42 (0.71)**
Current Public Approval		0.03 (0.00)**		0.05 (0.01)**
Current Inflation	-0.04 (0.01)**	-0.11 (0.04)**	-0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Current Election Year	-1.18 (0.13)**	-1.90 (0.20)**	-1.05 (0.18)**	-1.36 (0.18)**
<b><i>H4: Opposing President</i></b>				
D (Issuing President, Current President)	0.55 (0.12)**	0.78 (0.14)**	0.04 (0.09)	0.05 (0.09)
<b>Controls</b>				
Ln (EOs Issued)	-0.70 (0.19)**	-2.54 (0.26)**	0.29 (0.36)	1.89 (0.42)**
Current Administration Change	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.31 (0.18)	0.25 (0.14)	-0.23 (0.16)
Current End Term	0.65 (0.17)**	1.64 (0.27)**	0.83 (0.30)**	0.42 (0.30)
Current War	-1.07 (0.09)**	-1.20 (0.14)**	0.33 (0.24)	-0.93 (0.31)**
Current Trend	-0.10 (0.041)**	-0.14 (0.01)**	-0.01 (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)*
Log-likelihood	-11271.38	-5331.88	-5880.43	-5821.11
N	217,945	58,901	43,725	43,725
Years	1937 – 1968	1949 – 1968	1969 – 2013	1969 – 2013
Presidential Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES

Coefficients from Cox proportional hazards model with robust standard errors in parentheses and presidential fixed effects (not shown). Two tailed tests, \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01.

Given Reagan's role in systematically shaping unilateral power (Cooper 2002), Table B8 examines the analysis in the pre and post 1981 eras, illuminating similarities and differences with the previous analysis. Support for H1, H3, and H4 emerges more strongly in pre-1981 periods, while support for H2 remains strong across both time periods. Taken together, these results show that the substantive results generally hold when accounting for time, but the level of significance can vary depending on where the dividing line between periods is set, which can be arbitrary and substantially decreases the number of observations. The fact that the results still hold when interacting the covariates of interest with time and presidential fixed effects gives strong evidence for the theory across different administrations.

Table B8: Pre and Post 1981

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
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<b>EO-Specific Covariates</b>				
<u>H1: Ideological Compromise</u>				
D(President, Congress)	-2.99 (0.89)**	-2.69 (1.35)*	0.02 (0.96)	-0.12 (0.99)
<u>H2: EO Authority</u>				
Recent Statutory Authority		-0.27 (0.10)**		-0.62 (0.22)**
Foreign Policy	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.29 (0.09)**	-0.26 (0.14)	-0.33 (0.14)*
<u>Controls</u>				
NY Times Mention	0.26 (0.08)**	0.30 (0.09)**	-0.17 (0.16)	-0.34 (0.16)*
Public Mention	0.28 (0.10)**	0.07 (0.11)	0.93 (0.13)**	0.72 (0.13)**
Ln (EO Words)		0.24 (0.03)**		0.36 (0.05)**
War	-0.14 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.16)**	-0.02 (0.28)	0.12 (0.32)
Inflation	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)
Public Approval		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.01)
Election Year	0.07 (0.09)	0.16 (0.14)	0.29 (0.21)	0.25 (0.20)
Administration Change	0.24 (0.13)	0.19 (0.15)	0.24 (0.27)	0.39 (0.28)
End Term	-0.23 (0.12)*	-0.29 (0.16)	-0.13 (0.31)	-0.27 (0.33)
Trend	0.18 (0.02)**	0.13 (0.06)*	-0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.06)
<b>Time-Changing Political Covariates</b>				
<u>H3: Political Costs</u>				
D (Current President, Current Congress)	2.18 (0.27)**	6.40 (0.84)**	-1.84 (0.72)*	-2.12 (0.77)**
Current Public Approval		0.04 (0.01)**		0.05 (0.01)**
Current Inflation	0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)*	-0.33 (0.07)**	-0.22 (0.07)**
Current Election Year	-1.30 (0.12)**	-1.99 (0.18)**	-0.83 (0.19)**	-1.33 (0.23)**
<u>H4: Opposing President</u>				
D (Issuing President, Current President)	0.58 (0.09)**	0.37 (0.09)**	0.15 (0.16)	0.18 (0.15)
<u>Controls</u>				
Ln (EOs Issued)	-1.05 (0.16)**	-2.10 (0.28)**	1.80 (0.45)**	2.93 (0.49)**
Current Administration Change	-0.15 (0.10)	-0.75 (0.14)**	0.01 (0.23)	-0.33 (0.25)
Current End Term	1.28 (0.17)**	2.21 (0.24)**	-0.23 (0.39)	0.10 (0.36)
Current War	-0.74 (0.09)**	-0.84 (0.18)**	-0.26 (0.26)	-1.47 (0.37)**
Current Trend	-0.12 (0.01)*	-0.17 (0.01)	0.03 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)
Log-likelihood	-14724.56	-8606.05	-2746.60	-2714.39
N	241,028	81,984	20,642	20,642
Years	1937 – 1980	1949 – 1980	1981 – 2013	1981 – 2013
Presidential Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES

Coefficients from Cox proportional hazards model with robust standard errors in parentheses and presidential fixed effects (not shown). Two tailed tests, \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01.

### Nonproportional Hazards Model

In order to check the proportionality hazards (PH) assumption required for survival analysis, I perform tests of the non-zero slopes on the Schoenfeld residuals. These diagnostics reveal that several of the covariates exhibit non-proportional effects on executive order duration. To address these violations, I run the analysis from Table 2 of

the manuscript with Nonproportional Hazards (NPH) Models, which include interactions between the violating covariates from each model and the age of the executive order (see Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2003). Many of these interaction terms have significant effects and thus the covariates must be reinterpreted below. However, what this analysis reveals is that even when controlling for the non-proportional effects of these violating covariates, the substantive interpretation of the main variables remains the same.

To begin, variables measuring the alignment between the issuing president and Congress violate the PH assumption in three out of the four models. Though *Divided Government* is negative and significant, its interaction with *EO Age* is positive and also significant but has a smaller impact. Taken together, we can interpret the effect as follows: executive orders created under divided government tend to endure longer; while this effect is diminished over time, it still remains negative. The same interpretation can be applied when examining *D(President, Congress)* and its interaction with *EO Age*. Overall, even when accounting for these non-proportional effects, I still find support for the Ideological Compromise Hypothesis.

When examining the EO Authority Hypothesis, note that *Recent Authority* does not violate the PH assumption and remains negative and statically significant. Further, the effect of the *Foreign Policy* and *EO Age* interaction is insignificant, while the direct effect continues to significantly decrease EO revocation. In other words, foreign policy orders tend to endure longer and this effect is constant throughout an order's life. Thus, this analysis yields additional support for the EO Authority Hypothesis.

Both *Opposing President* and *D(Issuing President, Current President)* continue to significantly decrease executive order duration; yet these effects are slightly diminished

over the course of an order's life. Consequently, the Current Opposition Hypothesis remains supported. Similarly, the NPH model still yields support for the Political Capital Hypothesis. *Current Divided Government* corresponds to longer order durations and this effect becomes even more pronounced as the age of the order increases. Similarly, *Current D(President, Congress)* is insignificant but its interaction with *EO Age* is negative and significant. Thus, while the ideological distance between the president and Congress does not significantly impact the likelihood of an order revocation early in its life, it does significantly decrease its chances as time progresses.

As before, presidents still revoke executive orders less often during election years and this effect is exacerbated as the order's life progresses. Further, presidents with high approval ratings revoke orders often. While *Current Inflation* was generally insignificant in the previous PH analysis, the NPH models show that orders facing high inflation yield greater threats of revocation; but this effect is diminished over time. Overall, even when accounting for the non-proportional effects of many of these variables over time, the analysis still yields the same substantive interpretations. Many of the effects are either diminished or exacerbated over time, but the main overall effect remains the same. All of this yields further support for the theory's hypotheses.

Table B9: Nonproportional Hazards Model

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b><i>EO-Specific Covariates</i></b>				
H1: Ideological Compromise				
Divided Government	-0.42 (0.16)**		-0.52 (0.21)**	
D(President, Congress)		-2.95 (0.62)**		-2.77 (0.83)**
H2: EO Authority				
Recent Statutory Authority			-0.38 (0.09)**	-0.38 (0.09)**
Foreign Policy	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.36 (0.11)**	-0.40 (0.11)**
Controls				
NY Times Mention	0.16 (0.07)*	0.16 (0.07)*	0.01 (0.12)	-0.00 (0.12)
Public Mention	0.81 (0.11)**	0.78 (0.11)**	0.65 (0.12)**	0.61 (0.12)**
Ln (EO Words)			0.21 (0.04)**	0.27 (0.03)**

War	-0.01 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.13)	0.12 (0.19)	0.20 (0.18)
Inflation	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)
Public Approval			-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Election Year	0.24 (0.12)	0.19 (0.12)	0.60 (0.16)**	0.61 (0.17)**
Administration Change	-0.20 (0.15)	-0.08 (0.16)	-0.07 (0.16)	0.09 (0.12)
End Term	-0.49 (0.17)**	-0.47 (0.16)**	-0.79 (0.19)**	-0.78 (0.19)**
Trend	-0.24 (0.03)**	-0.20 (0.04)**	-0.26 (0.06)**	-0.16 (0.06)**
<b><i>Time-Changing Political Covariates</i></b>				
H3: Political Costs				
Current Divided Government	-0.08 (0.12)		-0.45 (0.21)*	
D (Current President, Current Congress)		0.76 (0.79)		-1.55 (0.98)
Current Public Approval			0.04 (0.01)**	0.02 (0.01)**
Current Inflation	0.09 (0.02)**	0.08 (0.02)**	0.16 (0.03)**	0.08 (0.03)**
Current Election Year	-0.39 (0.15)**	-0.42 (0.15)**	-1.09 (0.18)**	-1.00 (0.19)**
H4: Opposing President				
Opposing President	0.43 (0.12)**		0.43 (0.15)**	
D (Issuing President, Current President)		0.56 (0.13)**		0.58 (0.14)**
Controls				
Ln (EOs Issued)	0.20 (0.21)	0.08 (0.21)	0.20 (0.32)	1.18 (0.41)**
Current Administration Change	0.07 (0.17)	0.07 (0.16)	-0.24 (0.18)	0.04 (0.13)
Current End Term	0.18 (0.24)	0.24 (0.24)	0.82 (0.30)**	0.52 (0.31)
Current War	-0.31 (0.15)*	-0.44 (0.16)**	-0.04 (0.25)	-0.26 (0.30)
Current Trend	0.19 (0.04)**	0.17 (0.04)**	0.26 (0.05)**	0.27 (0.07)**
<b><i>Nonproportionality Controls</i></b>				
Divided Government x EO Age	0.02 (0.01)**		0.04 (0.01)**	
D(President, Congress) x EO Age				0.16 (0.04)**
Ln (EO Words) x EO Age			-0.00 (0.00)**	
Administration Change x EO Age	0.02 (0.01)*	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	
End Term x EO Age	0.03 (0.01)**	0.03 (0.01)**	0.05 (0.01)**	0.05 (0.01)**
Election Year x EO Age	-0.02 (0.01)**	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.04 (0.01)**	-0.04 (0.01)**
War x EO Age	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)*	-0.02 (0.01)**	-0.02 (0.01)**
Inflation x EO Age	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	
Foreign Policy x EO Age		-0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
NY Times Mention x EO Age			0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Public Mention x EO Age	-0.04 (0.01)**	-0.03 (0.01)**	-0.04 (0.01)**	-0.03 (0.01)**
Trend x EO Age	0.00 (0.00)**	0.00 (0.00)**	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)**
Current Divided Government x EO Age			-0.06 (0.02)**	
D (Current President, Current Congress) x EO Age		-0.39 (0.07)**		-0.29 (0.11)**
Opposing President x EO Age	-0.02 (0.01)**		-0.02 (0.01)*	
D (Issuing President, Current President) x EO Age		-0.04 (0.01)**		-0.03 (0.01)**
Ln (EOs Issued) x EO Age	-0.13 (0.02)**	-0.11 (0.02)**	-0.07 (0.01)**	-0.13 (0.05)**
Current Public Approval x EO Age				0.00 (0.00)**
Current Administration Change x EO Age	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	
Current End Term x EO Age	0.11 (0.01)**	0.11 (0.02)**	0.11 (0.03)**	0.10 (0.03)**
Current War x EO Age	0.07 (0.02)**	0.09 (0.01)**	0.02 (0.02)	0.05 (0.03)
Current Inflation x EO Age	-0.01 (0.00)**	-0.01 (0.00)**	-0.02 (0.00)**	-0.01 (0.00)**
Current Election Year x EO Age	-0.06 (0.01)**	-0.05 (0.01)**	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Current Trend x EO Age	-0.00 (0.00)**	0.01 (0.00)**	0.00 (0.00)**	0.01 (0.00)**

Log-likelihood	-17711.04	-17656.60	-11608.051	-11571.96
N	261,670	261,670	102,626	102,626
Years	1937 – 2013	1937 – 2013	1949 – 2013	1949 – 2013
Presidential Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES

Coefficients from Cox proportional hazards model with robust standard errors in parentheses and presidential fixed effects (not shown). Two tailed tests, \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ .

### *Multinomial Probit Analysis*

Another way to deal with the violation of the PH assumptions required for Cox proportional hazards model is to estimate a multinomial probit (MNP) model instead. Similar to the survival models, the data still maintains the executive order-year as the unit of observation; however, the MNP model does not require the same constraining assumptions of survival or logistic analysis (Imai and van Dyk 2005). Another advantage of the MNP model is that it allows us to account for the probability of the president not only revoking an executive order, but also of amending and superseding it. As previously mentioned, not all executive orders must be revoked in order to have their content affected. Instead, many of these orders are amended or superseded. Yet, survival analysis of these orders becomes more difficult given that the failure (or death) of an executive order does not occur when it is amended or superseded but, rather, when it is revoked. Even so, it is still important to examine why some executive orders are amended or superseded and if this is influenced by the same set of factors determining order revocation.

Since many amended executive orders are only slightly altered, such as to correct technical or grammatical mistakes, to change a number or a date, or to update the name of

an agency, I count an executive order as amended if it is substantively changed.<sup>7</sup> Thus, the dependent variable for the MNP analysis is coded as 0 if the order is neither substantively amended, superseded, nor revoked, 1 if it is substantively amended, 2 if it is superseded, and 3 if it is revoked in any given year.<sup>8</sup> Table B10 shows the coefficients for the MNP model, estimating the probability of an executive order being amended (column 1), superseded (column 2), or revoked (column 3) based on the same set of explanatory variables.

Overall, the results yield strong support for all of the hypotheses when examining the probability of revocation. Similar to the survival analysis, orders created under ideological division and based on strong authority are less likely to be revoked, while such terminations occur more often when there is disagreement between the issuing and current presidents, agreement between the current president and Congress, and high presidential approval. Additionally, many of the control variables exhibit the same effects as in the Cox PH models.

Table B10: Multinomial Probit Analysis

	Amended	Superseded	Revoked
<b><i>EO-Specific Covariates</i></b>			

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<sup>7</sup> Note that these minor changes usually occur through amendments rather than supersessions.

<sup>8</sup> To satisfy the assumptions of the multinomial probit, I create these categories as mutually exclusive. In other words, I code an executive order as 1 if it is amended but not revoked or superseded in a given year, 2 if an order superseded but not amended or revoked in a given year, etc. There are only a small number of executive orders that had a combination of amendments, revocations, or supersessions in any given year (0-2%).

<u>H1: Ideological Compromise</u>			
D (President, Congress)	1.55 (0.62)*	0.27 (0.59)	-1.05 (0.40)**
<u>H2: EO Authority</u>			
Recent Statutory Authority	0.24 (0.06)**	0.40 (0.07)**	-0.15 (0.05)**
Foreign Policy	0.36 (0.05)**	-0.15 (0.07)*	-0.12 (0.04)**
<u>Controls</u>			
NY Times Mention	0.26 (0.06)**	-0.11 (0.07)	0.07 (0.05)
Public Mention	0.01 (0.07)	0.20 (0.08)*	0.19 (0.05)**
Ln (EO Words)	0.60 (0.02)**	0.12 (0.03)**	0.18 (0.02)**
War	-0.01 (0.09)	0.13 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.07)
Inflation	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)
Public Approval	-0.01 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Election Year	0.14 (0.08)	0.03 (0.09)	0.08 (0.06)
Administration Change	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.13 (0.12)	0.08 (0.07)
End Term	0.02 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.12)	-0.16 (0.08)*
Trend	-0.08 (0.03)**	0.06 (0.03)	0.05 (0.02)**
<u>Time-Changing Political Covariates</u>			
<u>H3: Political Costs</u>			
D (Current President, Current Congress)	-0.59 (0.46)	-1.11 (0.54)*	-2.96 (0.36)**
Current Public Approval	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.02 (0.00)**
Current Inflation	-0.05 (0.02)**	0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)
Current Election Year	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.11)	-0.73 (0.07)**
<u>H4: Opposing President</u>			
D (Issuing President, Current President)	0.05 (0.06)	0.04 (0.08)	0.17 (0.04)**
<u>Controls</u>			
Ln (EO Issued)	0.29 (0.21)	0.37 (0.23)	-0.28 (0.17)**
Current Administration Change	-0.02 (0.10)	0.20 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.07)
Current End Term	-0.17 (0.15)	-0.14 (0.16)	0.83 (0.12)**
Current War	0.01 (0.12)	0.29 (0.14)*	0.21 (0.12)
Current Trend	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.09 (0.02)**
Log-likelihood	-9498.68	-9498.68	-9498.68
N	102,626	102,626	102,626
Years	1949 – 2013	1949 – 2013	1949 – 2013
Presidential Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES

Coefficients from multinomial probit regression, with robust standard errors in parenthesis and presidential fixed effects (not shown). Two tailed tests, \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01.

However, one contrasting factor to note is the difference in these effects when examining the probability that an order is amended. First, many of the changing political covariates do not have a significant impact, yielding very little support for H3 and H4. Second, many of the executive order-specific factors display an opposite effect on amendments versus revocations. In particular, while orders created under ideological conflict and based on stronger authority are less likely to be revoked, they are more likely

to be amended. This perhaps suggest that presidents value these sorts of orders; and when they want to change these policies, they have more of a willingness to amend these orders and work within their existing authority, instead of completely nullifying their authority through revocation.

Differences also emerge when examining the probability of supersessions. Similar to amendments, few variables related to the changing political climate are statistically significant. Furthermore, the analysis fails to find support for the notion that executive orders created under ideological division are more likely to be superseded. Finally, there is conflicting results of the effects of an executive order's authority on its likelihood of being superseded. In particular, an order is more likely to be superseded when it is based on recent statutory authority (similar to amendments), but less likely to be superseded if it is related to foreign policy (similar to revocations).

This analysis demonstrates that future studies should more thoroughly develop a theory of amendments and supersessions to account for these empirical discrepancies. However, it also demonstrates further support for the theory and robustness for the main empirical results regarding revocations, across various model specifications.

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