

**Supplemental Materials for  
Ideologically Sophisticated Donors:  
Which Candidates Do Individual Contributors Finance?**

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## Survey Invitation Letter

First\_Name Last\_Name  
Address  
City, ST ZIP

Date, 2013

Dear First\_Name,

We are writing to ask for your help in understanding the views of registered voters on important political issues facing America. To help give valuable input on these issues, we invite you to participate in a special online survey conducted through [REDACTED].

You were selected at random from a publicly available list of voters in America. This online survey takes approximately 10 minutes to complete and your answers are completely confidential. None of your information will ever be shared with political organizations or the public.

To ensure that only voters who have been invited can participate in the survey, we have provided a unique access code. To begin the survey:

1. Enter the following URL into any web browser: [http://\[REDACTED\].com](http://[REDACTED].com)
2. Click on “Take The [REDACTED] Voter Survey”
3. Enter the following “Access Code” in the space provided: **ACCESS\_CODE**

If you have trouble accessing the survey, please email us at [REDACTED] or call the survey helpline at [REDACTED]. Your responses are voluntary and will be kept confidential. If you have any questions about your rights as a study participant, you may contact the [REDACTED] Institutional Review Board by telephone at [REDACTED].

Enclosed is a small token of appreciation to thank you in advance for participating in the study. We hope that you enjoy sharing your thoughts and opinions within the questionnaire and we look forward to receiving your response.

Sincerely,

## Survey Questions for Policy Agreement Index

- Greenhouse Gases (April 6, 2011 – Vote 54 – S493): Does the respondent support a vote to repeal the EPA’s finding that greenhouse gases endanger human health and the environment as well as block the EPA from regulating greenhouse gases and weaken fuel economy standards? 1 = support, 0 = oppose
- Payroll Tax Holiday (February 17, 2012 – Vote 22 – HR3630): Does the respondent support a vote to extend through the end of 2012 the payroll tax holiday and unemployment insurance benefits? 1 = support, 0 = oppose
- Colombia Free Trade (October 12, 2011 – Vote 163 – HR 3078): Does the respondent support a vote to approve a free trade agreement between the United States and Colombia? 1 = support, 0 = oppose
- Patriot Act (May 26, 2011 – Vote 84): Does the respondent support a vote to renew the government's Patriot Act powers to search records and conduct roving wiretaps in pursuit of terrorists? 1 = support, 0 = oppose
- Religious Exemptions (March 1, 2012 – Vote 24 – S 1813): Does the respondent support a vote to prevent employers from opting out of birth control coverage in health policies unless the employer is a religious organization with moral objections? 1 = support, 0 = oppose
- ACA (December 23, 2009 – Vote 395 – HR 3590): Does the respondent support a vote to require all Americans to purchase health insurance, set up health insurance exchanges, and increase taxes on those making more than \$280,000 a year? 1 = support, 0 = oppose
- Bush Tax Cuts (January 1, 2013 – Vote 251 – HR 8): Does the respondent support a vote to permanently extend the Bush Era Tax Cuts for individuals making less than \$400,000 per year? 1 = support, 0 = oppose
- Dodd Frank (July 15, 2010 – Vote 206 – HR 4173): Does the respondent support a vote to increase oversight of financial institutions and establish a Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection? 1 = support, 0 = oppose
- Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (December 18, 2010 – Vote 281): Does the respondent support a vote to allow gays to openly serve in the armed services? 1 = support, 0 = oppose
- Dream Act (December 18, 2010 – Vote 278): Does the respondent support a vote allowing illegal immigrants, who were brought to the United States as minors, to pursue citizenship without returning to their country of origin? 1 = support, 0 = oppose
- Energy Restrictions (May 18, 2011 – Vote 73 – S 953): Does the respondent support a vote to reduce restrictions on offshore energy production? 1 = support, 0 = oppose

## **Weighting**

To calculate weights, we take the inverse probability of responding to the survey. That is, we want to place greater weight on the opinions of respondents who resemble those who did not respond to the survey. This way after weighting, the demographics (and therefore hopefully also the opinions) of respondents will resemble those of the sample. As an example, if we received a larger proportion of responses from whites than the proportion of whites in the sample, we want to down weight the responses from whites and upweight the responses of non-whites. Insofar that political opinions are correlated with demographics, this should bring the opinions expressed in the survey into line with what we expect would be the case in the entire sample (those who responded as well as those who did not). To calculate a probability of responding to the survey, we compute a logistic regression with response to the survey as the dependent variable. We then include a variety of demographic and geographic variables that we can observe among both respondents and non-respondents to the survey.

We are significantly limited in the variables that we can include in our weighting model because whatever variables we do use need to be available for both respondents and non-respondents. More generally, in order to include particular variables in our weighting model the distribution of these variables must be known in the entire population of interest. In surveys of the general American population, researchers often turn to census data to uncover the distribution of demographic variables in the general population. In our case, *a priori* we know very little about the population of campaign donors.

The publicly available file maintained by the FEC provides a few demographics, which we use in our model. The first is the total amount of money given by the donor. Including this variable in the weighting model will account for the possibility that respondents to our survey systematically gave more or less than non-respondents. Similarly, we include the total number of

donations given by the donor. Using the partisanship of the candidates the donor supports, we also measure the partisan preferences of the donors and include this measure in the model.

Donors who gave more than 75% of their contributions to candidates from one of the two major parties are labeled as supporting those particular parties. Donors who gave more than 25% of their contributions to the other party are labeled as independents (there are very few of these donors, < 5%). Finally, we include a variable indicating if the donor gave to candidates outside of their state or if they strictly gave to candidates within their state.

The FEC donor file also includes the address (including the zip code) of the donor. Using these zip codes, we draw upon census data to include several neighborhood-level variables in the model. The first of these variables is the median income of the donor's neighborhood (zip code). Insofar as income is related ideology, public opinion, and the amount of money given by potential donors, including this variable in the weighting accounts for differences that may exist between respondents and non-respondents. In addition to income, we also include measures of the neighborhood's racial and gender composition.

While we would ideally include individual-level variables, we do not know the income, race, and gender of non-respondents, and therefore cannot include these variables in the weighting model. Neighborhood averages serve as our best available proxy for these variables. We first present simple descriptive statistics that show the means of these different variables for respondents and non-respondents. The differences in the table suggest that there are statistically significant differences between respondents and non-respondents that need to be addressed through weighting.

Differences between Survey Respondents and Non-Respondents

Variable	Respondents	Non-respondents	Difference
Log(Total donation)	7.55	7.77	-0.22**
Number of Donations	4.59	4.83	-0.24
In State Donor	0.77	0.70	0.07**
Republican	0.33	0.53	-0.20**
Democrat	0.65	0.44	-0.21**
Independent	0.02	0.02	-0.004
Zip Median Income (in \$1000)	39.8	39.8	-0.06
Zip Percent Male	48.8	48.8	-0.03
Zip Percent White	80.5	79.9	0.53

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01 N = 2,906 respondents, 20,023 non-respondents to the survey

To account for these differences, we develop a model in which the dependent variable is whether or not the sampled individual responded to the survey. We then include the variables in the above table as regressors in a logit model. Formally, the model is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 responded_i = & \text{logit}(\alpha + \beta_1 \log(\text{total donation}_i) + \beta_2 \text{number donations}_i + \beta_3 \text{party}_i \\
 & + \beta_4 \text{in.state}_i + \beta_5 \text{median.income}_i + \beta_6 \text{pct.male}_i + \beta_7 \text{pct.white}_i + \epsilon_i)
 \end{aligned}$$

The results of the model are shown in the table below:

Weighting Model - Probability of Responding to Survey


Log(Total donation)	-0.07** (0.02)
Number of Donations	0.02** (0.004)
In State Donor	0.31** (0.06)
Republican	-0.88** (0.04)
Independent	-0.49** (0.15)
Zip Median Income	-0.005 (0.003)
Zip Percent Male	0.004 (0.007)
Zip Percent White	0.005** (0.001)
Constant	-1.75** (0.39)
Observations	22,326
Log Likelihood	-8,307
Statistical Model	Logit

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01

As shown in the difference in means table, the logistic model indicates that there are statistically significant differences between respondents and non-respondents. However, while many of these effects are statistically significant, the magnitudes are quite small, indicating that

while statistically different, there are not large substantial differences between respondents and non-respondents for any of the variables included.

After computing the model, we take the product of the overall response rate and the inverse probability of response as estimated in the model. This becomes the sampling weight used in our analysis. This method of propensity score weighting was first applied by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and David et al. (1983) and has been used in survey research in a variety of fields (Lohr 2009; Chen et al. 2012). Furthermore, Francia et. al (2003) use this method of weighting in their survey of congressional donors. The following figure shows the distribution of weights for the respondents to the survey.



### Senate committee and occupation matching

In order to match donor occupation with the appropriate Senate committee, we first assign each occupation an industry code from the Center for Responsive Politics. Although there are over 400 different industry codes, we assign each occupation based on one of the broader sector codes under which more specific industries are categorized. We then match these sector codes to the Senate committee whose jurisdiction most directly covers it.

<b>Senate Committee</b>	<b>List of Occupations Grouped by Center for Responsive Politics Sector Codes</b>	<b>Number of Dyad Matches</b>	<b>Percentage of All Matches</b>
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry	Agriculture	135	1.4
Armed Services	Defense	52	0.5
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs	Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	1096	11.2
Commerce, Science, and Transportation	Communications & Electronics; Construction; Transportation; Miscellaneous Business	2538	25.9
Energy and Natural Resources	Energy & Natural Resources	539	5.5
Environment and Public Works	Construction; Energy & Natural Resources	160	1.6
Foreign Relations	Other (intl affairs-related, e.g. international development organization, United Nations)	15	0.2
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions	Health; Labor; Education	2288	23.3
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs	Civil Servants/Public Officials	216	2.2
Judiciary	Lawyers and Lobbyist	1300	13.3
Small Business and Entrepreneurship	Other (self-employed)	699	7.1
Veterans Affairs	Other (veterans-related, e.g. Department of Veterans Affairs; veterans' organization)	12	0.1

## Supplemental Analyses and Descriptive Statistics: Tables A1-A10

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	St. Deviation	Min	Max
Donation	0.04	0.19	0	1
Policy Agreement	0.55	0.27	0	1
Competitiveness	1.95	1.19	1	4
In State	0.04	0.20	0	1
Same Party	0.46	0.50	0	1
Committee Match	0.16	0.36	0	1
Committee Chair	0.05	0.21	0	1
Finance Committee	0.32	0.47	0	1
Appropriations Committee	0.14	0.34	0	1
Majority Party	0.73	0.45	0	1
Terms in Office	1.41	1.19	0	6
Self-Reported Investor	0.20	0.40	0	1
Self-Reported Ideologue	0.77	0.42	0	1
Self-Reported Intimate	0.51	0.50	0	1
Net Worth	4.35	1.81	1	7
Income	6.10	2.92	1	10
Folded Donor Ideology	1.72	0.98	-3	3
Minority	0.07	0.26	0	1
Male	0.70	0.46	0	1
Education	5.49	0.87	1	6

The survey N is 2,905, but 2,815 respondents answered the policy questions within the survey. When we pair respondents with the 22 reelection seeking senators, we have  $N = 61,930$  dyads for respondents who answered the survey policy questions.

Table A2: Percentage of Donations by State, Party, and Committee Match

	Percentage
Same State	33.57
Different State	66.43
Same Party	72.28
Different Party	27.72
Committee Match	19.39
No Committee Match	80.61

This table shows the percentage of all donations given to incumbents of the same state as donors, different state, same party, different party, and by whether or not the incumbent is serving on a relevant committee that matches to donors' occupations.

Table A3: Percentage of Donations by the Intersection of State, Party, and Committee Match

	Same Party	Different Party	Same State	Different State
Same State	25.42	9.21		
Different State	46.86	18.51		
Committee Match	13.09	6.37	5.64	13.76
No Committee Match	59.19	21.35	27.93	52.67

This table shows the percentage of all donations given to incumbents examined at the intersection of two categories. For instance, the first column of the first row shows the percentage of all donations that were given to incumbents of the same state and same party of the donor (25.42%)

Table A4: Additional Tests of Ideological Targeting

Cases Included:	All	All	All	In State	In State Non-Donors	Out of State
Policy Agreement	2.40** (0.11)	1.49** (0.18)	1.49** (0.18)	2.31** (0.25)	5.49** (1.31)	1.78** (0.26)
Competitiveness		0.31** (0.02)	0.31** (0.02)	0.38** (0.04)	0.84** (0.26)	0.33** (0.03)
In State		2.81** (0.07)	2.81** (0.07)			0.58** (0.18)
Same Party		0.81** (0.10)	0.81** (0.10)	0.84** (0.12)	-0.15 (0.57)	0.95** (0.13)
Net Worth		0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.16)	0.01 (0.03)
Income		0.24** (0.02)	0.24** (0.02)	0.05** (0.01)	0.17 (0.09)	0.06** (0.02)
Folded Donor Ideology		-0.20** (0.04)	-0.20** (0.04)	-0.08** (0.03)	0.42 (0.32)	-0.12** (0.04)
Minority		-0.38* (0.16)	-0.38* (0.16)	-0.02 (0.13)	0.59 (1.02)	0.02 (0.15)
Male		0.18* (0.09)	0.19* (0.09)	0.18** (0.06)	-0.09 (0.64)	0.20* (0.10)
Age		0.01** (0.003)	0.01** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.003)
Education		0.07 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)	-0.14** (0.03)	0.06 (0.32)	-0.07 (0.05)
Constant	-4.60** (0.08)	-8.25** (0.41)	-8.26** (0.41)	-5.15** (0.24)	-15.88** (2.70)	-4.63** (0.42)
Observations	61,930 No Controls	51,920 Unweighted	51,920 Logit	12,936	27,060 Subsamples of Donors	11,330

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, two-tailed

Standard errors clustered by donor shown below rare events logit coefficients, except for Model 3, which is a traditional logit model. The dependent variable is  $Pr(\text{Donation}_{ij} = 1)$ .

Table A5: Additional Tests of Ideological Targeting

Cases Included:	Same Party & Same State	All	All	All	Strong Partisans	Non-Ideologues
Policy Agreement	1.49** (0.43)	2.62** (0.30)	1.66** (0.21)	1.89** (0.21)	0.98** (0.25)	1.22** (0.41)
Same Party * Policy Agreement		-2.00** (0.39)				
In State * Policy Agreement			-0.51 (0.37)			
Same Party		2.12** (0.24)	0.91** (0.11)	0.87** (0.10)	1.98** (0.18)	0.92** (0.17)
In State		2.51** (0.08)	2.90** (0.27)	2.47** (0.08)	2.53** (0.09)	2.38** (0.16)
Competitiveness	0.26** (0.05)	0.31** (0.02)	0.32** (0.02)		0.38** (0.03)	0.29** (0.05)
Net Worth	0.16** (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	-0.05 (0.06)
Income	0.12** (0.03)	0.21** (0.02)	0.21** (0.02)	0.21** (0.02)	0.23** (0.02)	0.24** (0.04)
Folded Donor Ideology	-0.28** (0.07)	-0.16** (0.04)	-0.20** (0.04)	-0.21** (0.04)	-0.15** (0.05)	-0.21** (0.07)
Minority	-0.33 (0.28)	-0.20 (0.16)	-0.21 (0.16)	-0.17 (0.16)	-0.11 (0.24)	-0.14 (0.29)
Male	0.35** (0.13)	0.23** (0.09)	0.24** (0.09)	0.18* (0.09)	0.18 (0.10)	0.49* (0.21)
Age	0.02** (0.01)	0.01 (0.003)	0.01 (0.003)	0.01* (0.003)	0.01 (0.004)	0.001 (0.01)
Education	0.18* (0.08)	0.08 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.10 (0.05)	0.10 (0.07)	0.04 (0.11)
Constant	-5.24** (0.63)	-8.48** (0.44)	-7.94** (0.39)	-8.06** (0.45)	-9.16** (0.52)	-7.13** (0.83)
Observations	1,488	51,379	51,370	51,370	32,956	10,912
		Same Party Interact	Same State Interact	Senator F.E.		

\* p&lt;0.05, \*\* p&lt;0.01, two-tailed

Standard errors clustered by donor shown below rare events logit coefficients. The dependent variable is  $Pr(\text{Donation}_{ij} = 1)$ .

Table A6: Additional Tests

Cases Included:	Max donation $\leq$ \$200	Max don. $>$ \$200	Max don. $>$ \$2000	Gave total $>$ \$20,000	Gave 1 Senator	$\geq$ 10 don.
Policy Agreement	2.10** (0.66)	1.73** (0.23)	1.78** (0.51)	1.98** (0.43)	1.24** (0.32)	1.89** (0.39)
Competitiveness	0.38** (0.08)	0.37** (0.03)	0.39** (0.04)	0.33** (0.04)	0.46** (0.05)	0.34** (0.04)
In State	2.61** (0.23)	3.45** (0.11)	3.18** (0.24)	1.67** (0.20)	4.74** (0.14)	1.47** (0.20)
Same Party	0.36 (0.33)	1.00** (0.12)	1.18** (0.27)	1.06** (0.23)	1.14** (0.15)	0.99** (0.20)
Net Worth	0.20* (0.09)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.17* (0.08)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.05)
Income	0.08 (0.06)	0.12** (0.02)	0.18** (0.05)	0.06 (0.04)	0.06** (0.01)	0.07* (0.03)
Folded Donor Ideology	0.01 (0.18)	-0.14** (0.04)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.13** (0.02)	-0.14** (0.05)
Minority	0.48 (0.61)	-0.10 (0.15)	-0.34 (0.35)	-0.11 (0.25)	0.12 (0.13)	-0.26 (0.24)
Male	-0.11 (0.27)	0.13 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.19)	-0.10 (0.16)	0.30** (0.06)	0.11 (0.14)
Age	0.03** (0.01)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.005)
Education	0.44* (0.19)	-0.07 (0.05)	0.07 (0.09)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.07)
Constant	-13.68** (1.12)	-5.41** (0.38)	-5.77** (0.70)	-4.45** (0.64)	-5.95** (0.32)	-4.28** (0.53)
Observations	28,556	22,814	5,214	4,796	17,248	5,522

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , two-tailedStandard errors clustered by donor shown below rare events logit coefficients. The dependent variable is  $Pr(\text{Donation}_{ij} = 1)$ .

Table A7: Additional Tests of Investor Models

Cases Included:	All	All	All	Employed	Competitive Races
Policy Agreement	1.90** (0.21)	1.54** (0.18)	1.78** (0.20)	1.70** (0.25)	2.11** (0.28)
Same Party	0.87** (0.10)	0.82** (0.10)	0.83** (0.11)	0.88** (0.12)	1.05** (0.13)
In State	2.48** (0.08)	2.81** (0.07)	2.51** (0.08)	2.48** (0.10)	
Competitiveness		0.31** (0.02)	0.33** (0.03)	0.27** (0.03)	
Committee Match	0.41** (0.08)	0.36** (0.07)		0.31** (0.09)	0.28* (0.12)
Committee Match * Investor			0.55** (0.14)		
Committee Match * Non Investor			0.31** (0.09)		
Investor			0.01 (0.10)		
Committee Chair		0.08 (0.11)	0.03 (0.13)	-0.01 (0.17)	0.35* (0.16)
Finance Committee		-0.10 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.08)	0.08 (0.10)	-1.31** (0.22)
Appropriations Committee		-0.05 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.20* (0.10)
Majority Party		-0.06 (0.09)	-0.35** (0.09)	-0.50** (0.11)	-0.65** (0.15)
Terms in Office		-0.001 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.54** (0.16)
Standard Controls Included.					
Observations	51,370 Senator F.E.	51,920 Unweighted	46,926 Joint Model	27,962	16,345 Cook $\geq 3$

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, two-tailed

Standard errors clustered by donor shown below rare events logit coefficients. The dependent variable is  $Pr(\text{Donation}_{ij} = 1)$ .

Table A8: Committee Match - Omit One Committee at a Time

Committee Excluded:	Banking	Commerce	Health	Judiciary	Finance	Appropriations
Policy Agreement	1.50** (0.20)	1.68** (0.21)	1.72* (0.20)	1.76** (0.21)	2.13** (0.22)	1.61** (0.19)
Committee Match	0.24** (0.08)	0.57** (0.09)	0.41** (0.08)	0.38** (0.08)	0.33** (0.09)	0.35** (0.08)
Competitiveness	0.31** (0.03)	0.34** (0.03)	0.29** (0.03)	0.31** (0.03)	0.32** (0.03)	0.30** (0.03)
In State	2.50** (0.08)	2.47** (0.09)	2.47** (0.08)	2.50** (0.08)	2.43** (0.09)	2.48** (0.08)
Same Party	1.03** (0.11)	0.86** (0.11)	0.91** (0.10)	0.85** (0.11)	0.82** (0.11)	0.85** (0.10)
Majority Party	-0.43** (0.09)	-0.64** (0.09)	-0.32* (0.09)	-0.40** (0.09)	-0.36** (0.09)	-0.41** (0.08)
Terms in Office	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.12* (0.05)	0.004 (0.06)	-0.10* (0.06)	0.01 (0.03)
Net Worth	0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
Income	0.22** (0.02)	0.22** (0.02)	0.20** (0.02)	0.20** (0.02)	0.21** (0.02)	0.21** (0.02)
Folded Donor Ideology	-0.20** (0.04)	-0.23** (0.05)	-0.22** (0.04)	-0.20** (0.04)	-0.18** (0.04)	-0.24** (0.04)
Minority	-0.22 (0.17)	-0.19 (0.16)	-0.12 (0.16)	-0.09 (0.16)	-0.15 (0.16)	-0.12 (0.16)
Male	0.13 (0.09)	0.33** (0.09)	0.12 (0.09)	0.17 (0.09)	0.18 (0.09)	0.13 (0.09)
Age	0.01** (0.003)	0.006 (0.003)	0.01* (0.003)	0.01* (0.003)	0.01* (0.003)	0.01 (0.003)
Education	0.11 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	0.10* (0.05)	0.13** (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)	0.13* (0.06)
Constant	-7.95** (0.42)	-7.51** (0.43)	-7.68** (0.42)	-7.93** (0.42)	-7.94** (0.45)	-7.73** (0.43)
Observations	42,030	37,360	42,030	42,030	35,025	44,365

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, two-tailed

The first four models exclude the most common committees of senators in the sample. The final two models exclude committees that are commonly thought of as powerful committee assignments to hold. Standard errors clustered by donor shown below rare events logit coefficients. The dependent variable is  $Pr(\text{Donation}_{ij} = 1)$ .

Table A9: Additional Tests of Donation Amount

Model:	Tobit (\$ $\geq$ 200)	ZINB	ZINB	ZINB
Policy Agreement	0.44 (4.66)	-0.03 (0.17)	-0.02 (0.16)	-0.03 (0.28)
Same Party	-2.10 (2.15)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.14 (0.11)
In State	6.08** (1.70)	0.25** (0.06)	0.24** (0.06)	0.30** (0.10)
Competitiveness	0.50 (0.61)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
Committee Match	2.60 (1.71)	0.12 (0.06)	0.11 (0.05)	0.15 (0.09)
Committee Chair	-5.93* (2.59)	-0.24 (0.12)	-0.24* (0.11)	-0.26 (0.22)
Finance Committee	-4.29* (1.79)	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.28* (0.11)
Appropriations Committee	1.40 (2.04)	0.06 (0.07)	0.06 (0.06)	0.03 (0.10)
Majority Party	-2.07 (2.12)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.12)
Terms in Office	1.07 (0.86)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)
Net Worth	0.56 (0.62)	0.004 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.07 (0.04)
Income	2.80** (0.37)	0.11** (0.02)	0.11** (0.01)	0.11** (0.03)
Folded Donor Ideology	1.77 (0.94)	0.07 (0.04)	0.07 (0.03)	0.10 (0.06)
Minority	-3.44 (3.72)	-0.14 (0.14)	-0.14 (0.13)	-0.10 (0.23)
Male	0.19 (1.93)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.12)
Age	0.07 (0.08)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)
Education	-0.35 (1.11)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.06)
Constant	-2.81 (8.39)	6.11** (0.29)	1.54** (0.30)	-0.74 (0.46)
Observations	1,766 binned by \$50	51,289 dollar amount	51,289 binned by \$100	51,289 binned by \$500

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , two-tailed

Standard errors clustered by donor shown below coefficients. The dependent variable is amount of money given by donor<sub>*i*</sub> to senator<sub>*j*</sub>. In the Tobit model the lower limit is set to \$200. The upper limit is set to \$5,000. Models 2 through 4 show zero inflated negative binomial coefficients. In models 3 and 4 the DV is the donation amount binned by \$100 and \$500 increments respectively. For example, donations between \$1-99 are coded 1, \$100-199 are coded 2, \$200-299 are coded 3, etc. Model 4 is similar within binning at \$500 increments.

Table A10: Presidential Giving


Obama Policy Agreement	4.55** (0.20)
Folded Donor Ideology	0.23** (0.03)
Net Worth	-0.005 (0.02)
Income	-0.02 (0.01)
Minority	0.34** (0.12)
Male	-0.10 (0.07)
Age	0.001 (0.003)
Education	-0.06 (0.04)
Constant	-3.62** (0.28)
Observations	52,140

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , two-tailed

Standard errors shown below probit coefficients. The dependent variable is  $Pr(\text{Donation}_{ij} = 1)$ .

## Supplemental Figures

**Figure A1: Donation and Policy Agreement Lowess Line**



This figure shows lowess smoother lines with incumbent policy agreement on the x-axis and the probability of donating on the y-axis.

**Figure A2: Lowess Lines by State, Party, and Committee Match**




Figure A2 shows lowess smoother lines with incumbent policy agreement on the x-axis and the probability of donating on the y-axis. Each panel depicts this lowess line holding one of the independent variables of interest constant. In particular, the top row shows this relationship among in and out of state donors. The second row shows this relationship for donors who share or do not share the senator’s partisan affiliation. The bottom row shows when donors have a committee match with the senator.